Karl Marx; Friedrich Engels: Complete Works (MEGA). Works, Articles, Drafts / Karl Marx: Works, Articles, Drafts. March 1843 to August 1844
In the Phenomenology, absolute knowledge is described as follows:
1) In the religion of revelation, the actual self-consciousness of spirit (Geist) is not yet the object of its consciousness; the spirit and its instances fall into representation (Vorstellen) as well as into the form of objectivity. The content of representation is the absolute spirit; what remains is the sublation (Aufheben) of this mere form.
2) This overcoming of the object of consciousness is not merely the object presenting itself as reverting into the self, but more precisely that it presents itself as vanishing in its very being, and even more so that it is the externalization (Entäußerung) of self-consciousness that posits thinghood (Dingheit), and that this externalization has not only negative but positive significance exclusively for itself. For self-consciousness, the negativity of the object or its self-sublation has positive meaning, or it knows the nothingness (Nichtigkeit) of the object by externalizing itself, for in this externalization, it posits itself as the object or posits the object, for the sake of the indivisible unity of being-for-self, as itself. On the other hand, that self-consciousness has equally sublated and retrieved into itself this externalization and objectivity, and thus is in contact with itself in its otherness as such.
3) This is the movement of consciousness, and in this movement, consciousness is the totality of its instances. It must relate to the object according to the totality of its determinations and at the same time it must have grasped itself in each of them. This totality of determinations makes the object into a spiritual being (geistiges Wesen), and for consciousness, it becomes this in truth by apprehending each of these determinations as the self or through the aforementioned spiritual relation to them.
4) The object thus presents immediate being or a thing in general—corresponding to immediate consciousness; partly a becoming-other (Anderswerden) of itself, its relation or being-for-other and being-for-self, determinateness—corresponding to perception; and partly essence or universality—which corresponds to the understanding. (Being, essence, concept; generality, particularity, singularity. Position, negation, negation of negation; simple counter- immediacy. Mediation. To be resolved, decided, cancelled. Unity. Difference being-substituting mediation. Being. Disengagement. Return from the decision to disown. Identity. Negation. Negativity. rung in itself. In itself. For itself. In and of itself. Logic. Nature. Mind. Pure consciousness. Consciousness. Self-consciousness. Concept. Judgement. Conclusion). The object is the end or the movement of the general through determination to individuality, like the reverse movement from individuality through it as sublated or as determination to the universal. According to these three determinations, consciousness must therefore know the object as itself. However, this is not knowledge as the pure comprehension (Begreifen) of the object which is the matter at hand, rather this knowledge is only to be shown in its becoming or in its instances with respect to the aspect that belongs to consciousness as such, and the instances of the proper concept or pure knowing in the form of shapes (Gestaltungen) of consciousness. Hence, the object does not yet appear in consciousness as the spiritual Beingness we have articulated, and its relation to it is not the contemplation of it in this totality, nor in its pure conceptual form, but partly the design (Gestalt) of consciousness in general, partly a number of such shapes that we gather and in which a totality of instances of the object and of the behaviour of consciousness can only be shown dissolved into its instances.
5) Regarding the object insofar as it is immediate, an indifferent being, we saw observing reason seeking and finding itself in this indifferent thing—i.e., becoming conscious of its activity as something just as external as it is conscious of the object only as something immediate. It expresses its determination in the infinite judgment that the being of the I is a thing. And indeed, a sensible immediate thing; when the I is called ”soul,” it is also represented as an invisible, intangible thing. So, it is in truth, not an immediate being, which is what is meant by a thing. That spiritless judgment, by contrast, is in its concept the most spiritual.
Therefore the thing is I, i.e., the thing is sublated; it is nothing in itself; it has meaning only in relation, only through the I and its relation to it. This has emerged for consciousness in pure insight and enlightenment. Things are simply useful and are to be considered only in terms of their utility. The cultivated self-consciousness, which has traversed the world of self-alienated spirit, has through its externalization birthed the thing as itself, and thus retains itself in it, the thing is essentially only a being-for-other. Or, expressed more correctly as the relation, which here alone constitutes the nature of the object. The thing counts for it as a being-for-self; it does not just declare Sense as imminent, but this being-for-self itself as a moment that merely vanishes and passes over into its opposite, into the surrendered being-for-other. However, the knowledge of the thing is not yet complete; it must be known not only in terms of the immediacy of being and determinateness but also as essence, as the self. This is present in moral self-consciousness. It knows its knowing as the absolute essence as pure will or knowing, it is nothing but this will or knowing; to anything else belongs only non-essential being, i.e., being that is not in itself, only its empty husk. Insofar as moral consciousness releases existence from the self in its world-representation, it equally retrieves it back into itself. As conscience, it is no longer the aforementioned alternating positing and displacing of existence and the self, rather, it knows that its existence as such is pure certainty of itself; the objective element into which it presents as acting is nothing other than the pure knowledge of the self of itself.
6) These are the instances from which the reconciliation of spirit with its actual consciousness is composed; as such, they are singular, and their spiritual unity alone constitutes the force of this reconciliation. The last of these instances is this unity itself and which gathers them all within itself. The spirit which is certain of itself in its existence has as the point of existence nothing else than this knowledge of itself; the declaration that what it does, it does from conviction of duty, its language is the validity (Money) of its acting. Acting is the first in-itself separation of the simplicity of the concept and the return from this separation. This first movement turns into the second, as the element of recognition posits itself as simple knowledge of duty against the difference and division that lie in acting as such and thus forms an iron reality against acting. We saw how this hardness relinquishes and externalizes itself. Here, therefore, reality has for self-consciousness no significance as immediate existence other than that of being pure knowledge—just as, as determinate existence or relation, what is a knowledge partly of this pure singular self, partly of knowledge as universal. Herein is also posited that the third instance, universality or essence, counts for each of the two opposites only as knowledge; and they finally equally sublate the empty opposition that remains and are the knowledge of I = I, this singular self that is immediately pure knowledge or universal.
The reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness has thus come about in a twofold way: 1) in religious spirit, 2) in consciousness as such. 1) Reconciliation in the form of being-in-itself (Ansich); 2) in the form of being-for-itself (Fürsich). As they are being contemplated, they fall apart. The unification of the two sides is now to be shown: 1) Spirit in itself, absolute content; 2) for itself, contentless form or from the side of self-consciousness; 3) spirit in and for itself.
7) This unification is present in religion as the return of representation into self-consciousness, but not in its developed form, for the religious is of being-in-itself, which stands opposed to the movement of self-consciousness. The unification belongs to the other side, which, in opposition, is the side of reflection into self—i.e., the side that contains, developed and distinguished for itself, itself and its opposite. The content, as well as the other side of spirit as other, is present and has been shown in its completeness; the unification still lacking is the simple unity of the concept. The concept is the beautiful soul, the shape of the spirit certain of itself, which remains at the level of its concept. Holding itself fast in opposition to its realization, it is the one-sided shape that vanishes into empty mist; but it is also positive externalization and progression. Through this realization, the determinacy of the concept against its fulfillment sublates itself; its self-consciousness attains the form of universality. The true concept, the knowledge of pure knowing as essence, is this knowing, this pure self-consciousness, which is thus at the same time the true object, for it is the self that is for itself.
The fulfillment of this concept is partly in acting spirit, partly in religion. … In the first shape, the form is the self itself, for it contains the acting spirit certain of itself; the self leads the life of absolute spirit. This shape is that simple concept, but it relinquishes its eternal essence in that it is or acts. The division or emergence it has in the purity of the concept, for this is absolute abstraction or negativity. Likewise, the element of being or its actuality is in the concept itself, for it is simple immediacy, which is equally being and existence as essence—the former negative, the latter positive thinking itself. Hegel now further develops the tedious process of the beautiful soul, whose result is the pure universality of knowing, which is self-consciousness. — The concept connects it such that the content is the self’s own doing; for this concept is the knowledge of the self’s doing in itself as all essence and all existence, the knowledge of this subject as substance and of substance as this knowledge of its doing.
8) The spirit knowing itself in its spiritual shape is comprehending (begreifen) knowledge. The truth is not only in itself equal to certainty but also has the shape of certainty of itself—i.e., it is in its existence (Dasein), for the knowing spirit, in the form of knowledge of itself. The truth is the content that in religion is still unequal to its certainty. But this equality consists in the content having received the shape of the self. Thereby, what the essence itself is, the concept, has become the element of existence or the form of objectivity for consciousness. Spirit appearing to consciousness in this sense or produced by it therein is science. It is the pure being-for-self of self-consciousness. It is I, this and no other I. It is just as the likewise mediated or sublated universal I.
It has a content that it distinguishes from itself; for it is pure negativity or dichotomisation. It is consciousness. This content is in its difference itself the I, for it is the movement of self-sublation or the same pure negativity that the I is. The I is reflected into itself in this content as differentiated; the content is comprehended only insofar as the I is at home with itself in its otherness.
This content is nothing other than the movement, for it is spirit that traverses itself and indeed for itself as spirit, by having the shape of the concept in its objectivity. As for the existence of this concept, science cannot be birthed until spirit has arrived at this consciousness about itself. Spirit that knows what it is exists nowhere earlier or elsewhere than after the completion of the labour of subduing its imperfect shape or of procuring for its consciousness the shape of its essence, and in this way equating its self-consciousness with its consciousness. See the continuation, p. 583 ff. The selfless being is hidden; only the certainty of itself is manifest. The relation of time to history. Comprehending spirit bears time. Experience and knowledge, the transformation of substance into subject, of the object of consciousness into the object of self-consciousness, that is to say into an equally sublated object or concept. Only as this self-reflective becoming is it spirit. Insofar as spirit is necessarily distinguishing within itself, its whole, intuited, stands opposed to its simple self-consciousness, and since the former is the differentiated, it is differentiated into its intuited pure concept and into the content, the in-itself (Ansich). Substance as subject has within itself the inner necessity of presenting itself as what it is, spirit. The completed objective presentation is at the same time the reflection of this presentation or its becoming the self. Until spirit has completed itself as world spirit, it cannot attain its completion as self-conscious spirit. The content of religion therefore expresses earlier in time what spirit is than science does, but science alone is its true knowledge of itself. … The movement, the form of its knowledge of itself
This translation preserves Hegel’s technical terms (e.g., Aufheben as ”sublation,” Fürsichsein as ”being-for-self”) and attempts to convey the density of his prose while making it accessible in English. Some passages remain highly abstract due to the nature of the original text.)
notes
- Entäusserung is differntiated from alienated as externalisation rather than alienation, other translations have at times used alienation for both or describe entfremdung as estrangment.
- This translation preserves Hegel’s technical terms (e.g., Aufheben as ”sublation,” Fürsichsein as ”being-for-self”) and attempts to convey the density of his prose while making it accessible in English. Some passages remain highly abstract due to the nature of the original text.)
- Not sure about how to translate gestalt. Design fits kinda
- Handeln translated to acting might be wrong
Framåt Barbarer 